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SKILLING. MORE BLIND MONKS
EXAMINING THE ELEPHANT
Julie Rose O'Sullivan*
I. The Statute was Unconstitutionally Vague and the Court's

"Limiting Construction" Constituted Improper Legislation ... 345
II. "Honest-Services" Fraud as an Object Lesson in Why
Congress Ought to be Charged with Defining the Scope of
Criminal Law ................................................................................ 351
Most academics and practitioners with whom I have discussed the
result in Skilling v. United States believe that it is a sensible decision. 1
That is, the Supreme Court did the best it could to limit the reach of
18 U.S.C. § 1346, which all nine justices apparently believedcorrectly- was, on its face, unconstitutionally vague. 2 My friends
reason that the Court had already tried once, in McNally v. United
States,3 to force Congress to "speak more clearly than it has" 4 in defining the outer limits of "honest-services"5 fraud. Congress responded quickly and with little consideration with the supremely under-defined § 1346. In the over twenty years since the statute's
enactment, the Courts of Appeals have been unable to come up with
any unified limiting principles to contain its reach. The Skilling
Court, evidently reluctant to again throw the matter back to Congress
given that institution's previous default, and not satisfied with the
'Associate Dean and Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to
thank Jessica Wash and Andrew Prodromos for their research assistance and the staff
of this journal for their patience and understanding.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
2. See id at 2929 ("[W]e acknowledge that Skilling's vagueness challenge has
force"); id at 2931 ("Reading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct [beyond bribery and kickbacks], we acknowledge, would raise the due process
concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine."); id at 2931 n.42 ("Apprised that a
broader reading of§ 1346 could render the statute impermissibly vague, Congress, we
believe, would have drawn the honest-services line, as we do now, at bribery and
kickback schemes."); id at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. 483 u.s. 350 (1987).
4. Id at 360.
5. Id at 362-64.
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Courts of Appeals' efforts, was determined to come up with its own
"narrowing interpretation." 6 Thus, the majority deemed it appropriate to rewrite the statute to cover what it concluded was the "core" of
the criminality the prosecutors had addressed in bringing § 1346
cases-bribery and kickbacks. 7 The Court comes up with narrowing
constructions to avoid constitutional difficulties in many statutory interpretation cases, the argument goes, and this construction is one
that many in the academic and practice communities believe is reasonable.
My only quibble with this consensus lies in my conviction that what
the Court did in Skilling is as patently unconstitutional as § 1346and that its foray into legislation is not of only academic concern. It
clearly accepted Congress' delegation of law-making authority and
essentially promulgated a new statute out of the "dog's breakfast"
that was pre-Skilling § 1346. 8 Some would argue that this is a good
thing from a practical, if not an orthodox separation-of-powers, point
of view. In what I hope will be taken as a back-handed compliment, I
will focus on Professor Dan M. Kahan's long-standing arguments in
this regard. Kahan favors administrative specification of the content
of arguably vague criminal prohibitions, but he believes that if one
has to choose between judicial gap-filling and congressional action,
the former is preferable to the latter. Kahan has argued that the
Court ought to come clean and simply acknowledge that it has long
been engaged in interstitial lawmaking because Congress has declined
to legislate with any specificity and "[a] criminal code at least partially
specified by courts is both less costly and more effective than is a code
fully specified by Congress." 9 Even were I prepared to join Professor
Kahan in discounting the effect of judicial law-making on normative
commitments to the "democratic accountability, notice and other
rule-of-law values," 10 I disagree with his conclusion about the viability and attractiveness of this delegation of authority to federal courts
to fill in the blanks in otherwise underspecified statutory schemes. It
strikes me that the history of the honest-services fraud theory, which
6. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.43.
7. Id at 2931.
8. Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251, 254
(2010).
9. Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BuFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 12 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Three Conceptions]; see also Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469
(1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Chevron].
10. Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 11.
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culminated in Skilling, presents a wonderful example of how criminal
law ought not be made, whether viewed from an institutional, societal, or individual standpoint.
I. THE STATUTE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND THE
COURT'S "LIMITING CONSTRUCTION" CONSTITUTED IMPROPER
LEGISLATION

All the justices concluded that § 1346, viewed on its face, was
vague. If a statute is unconstitutionally vague, such that it does not
give ordinary citizens fair notice and is susceptible to arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, what should the Court do? The Skilling
majority asserted that "[i]t has long been our practice ... before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague to consider whether the
prescription is amenable to a limiting construction." 11 Thus, the majority contended, it "does not legislate, but instead respects the legislature, by preserving a statute through a limiting interpretation. " 12
When one examines the nineteen precedents cited in support of this
supposedly hallowed practice,B however, its legitimacy looks a lot
shakier than the Court lets on- at least in this context. First, in only
three of the nineteen cases cited did the Court directly address a
vagueness challenge. 14 In the others, the Court employed its "constitutional avoidance" canon of construction to avoid potential First
Amendment and other specific constitutional issues. Second, only ten
of the cases involved a challenge to a criminal statute. 15 More to the
point, in only one case hailing from 1954 did the Court actually adopt
a limiting construction to avoid holding a criminal statute unconstitutionally vague. 16 In another, it found that even a judicially-created
limiting construction could not save the vague criminal prohibition at
issue- a prohibition that threatened First Amendment valuesP
11. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929.
12. Id at 2931 n.43.
13. Id at 2929 n.40.
14. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 (1988); United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 618 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,769 n.24 (1982) (overbreadth).
15. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); United States ex rei Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366 (1909); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); United States v. Coombs, 12
Pet. 72 (1838); see supra note 14.
16. See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618. In Boos, the Court found that the criminal statute at issue was not vague. Boos, 485 U.S. at 332.
17. Winters, 333 U.S. at 518-19.
·
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I think these distinctions- based on the criminal character of the
case and the type of constitutional challenge lodged- are important
in assessing the legitimacy of the Court's remedy. As the Court has
pointed out, "[t]he standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction
for enforcement," and for very good reason. 18 "[T]he first principle" 19
of criminal law-the principle of legality-outlaws the retroactive
definition of criminal offenses.
It is condemned because it is retroactive and also because it is judicial- that is, accomplished by an institution not recognized as politically competent to define crime. Thus, a fuller statement of the legality ideal would be that it stands for the desirability in principle of
advance legislative specification of criminal misconduct. 20
This foundational principle simply does not apply in civil cases.
The vagueness doctrine's "connection to [the principle of] legality
is obvious: a law whose meaning can only be guessed at remits the actual task of defining criminal misconduct to retroactive judicial
decisionmaking. " 21 Where a statute is vague- and thus by definition
lacks ascertainable standards to guide citizens or law enforcement in
the administration of criminal penalties- it is difficult to conceive
how the Court can articulate such standards without legislating. Despite the Court's inexplicable reliance on the rule of lenity in declining to include undisclosed conflicts of interest in the newly articulated
honest-services canon, this is not a case of ambiguity. The Court was
not asked to elect between two equally plausible definitions of a term
(or grammatical constructions of a phrase) embedded in otherwise
reasonably articulated elements. Nor was it, as in other constitutional
avoidance cases, making a choice among reasonably defined alternatives. For example, in First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Court
is tasked with construing a clear statute that could, if not narrowed,
impinge on protected speech. The Court was not, in short, asked to
elect among two or even five alternative meanings. Rather, it was
tasked with electing among a wealth of alternative means of defining
and thus limiting the reach of a statute in which none of the big three

18. Id at 515.
19. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
The legality principle is one of the most basic of the human rights identified in a myriad of international treaties and declarations.
20. John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189,190 (1985).
21. Jd at 196.
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of criminal statutes- the conduct, mens rea, and attendant circumstances-are defined with any particularity.
Indeed, such were the smorgasbord of choices that required resolution to truly define the reach of this statute that even if one were to
conclude that judicial definition of some vague statutes is permissible,
this statute is not one that is susceptible to a reasonable narrowing interpretation.22 As I have laid out at greater length elsewhere, this
statute represents "vagueness on steroids,"23 in part because "when
courts (let alone ordinary citizens) cannot agree on what conductattended by what mental state and what attendant circumstancesconstitutes a crime, it is a vagueness trifecta." 24 The Court took these
cases to decide three issues, although it ultimately failed to address
them: must the government prove that it was reasonably foreseeable
that the honest-services scheme could cause some economic or pecuniary harm to the victims (Black v. United States); 25 must the duty to
disclose, the violation of which constitutes the "fraud," arise under
state law ( Weyhrauch v. United States); 26 and must the defendant intend to obtain private gain from the victim to whom honest-services
are owed (Ski1Jing)P But these are only three of the many questions
that have split the circuits. Other critical questions include: what creates a duty of honest-services; what constitutes a breach of that duty;
must a separate duty to disclose be found or is such a duty inherent in
any case in which a duty of loyalty is found; what mental state need
be proven and does the mental state differ, as most circuits hold, in
public and private honest-services cases; must the government prove
the attendant circumstances of the materiality of the breach, as well
as the non-disclosure?2S
The Court was determined to strike out on its own and adopt a limiting construction that had not occurred to any of the many courts
struggling with this statute for the past twenty years. 29 Instead of an22. See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud· A (Vague) Threat to
Millions of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 V AND. L.
REV. EN BANC 23 (2010).
23. ld at 26.
24. Id at 30.
25. 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010).
26. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
27. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
28. See O'Sullivan, supra note 22, at 31-41.
29. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Among all the preMcNally smorgasboard-offerings of varieties of honest -services fraud, not one is limited to bribery and kickbacks. That is a dish the Court has cooked up all on its
own.").
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swering the questions presented and resolving at least three circuit
splits, then, it decided to "rule in" two categories of conduct- bribes
and kickbacks- while eliminating a third- undisclosed conflicts of
interest. 30 On what principled basis can one argue that the Court is
merely adopting a reasonable narrowing construction rather than
recrafting the statute by making these novel distinctions? The
Court's argument for why its holding represents the former, not the
latter, is sloppy at best and disingenuous at worst. It identifies bribery
and kickbacks as the "core" honest-services precedents in the preMcNally period based on quotations from Courts of Appeals decisions and the Solicitor General's ("SG's") assertion. 31 It concludes on
this basis that Congress, in § 1346, must have intended to include at
least these two types of offenses. 32 There are any number of problems with this analysis.
The first is a factual difficulty evident to those who have studied
the honest-services caselaw over time. I, at least, have seen no empirical proof for the proposition that these two categories of cases predominate the pre-McNallycaselaw and do not believe that this assertion is necessarily correct. Justice Stevens, in his McNally dissent,
documented the amazing variety of pre-McNally "honest-services"
cases, demonstrating that the "intangible rights" held to be protected
extended far beyond a right to the honest-services of public and private employees to intangibles such as the right to honest elections and
the right to privacy. 33 In its Skilling brief, the SG cited twenty-nine
cases involving either bribery or kickbacks, but it also identified thirteen cases that dealt only with undisclosed conflicts of interest. 34
When the rest of the intangible rights are added to the mix, I doubt
whether the bribery or the kickback cases do indeed predominate as
represented. Certainly, if these two criteria- isolated quotations
from Courts of Appeals decisions and the SG's proffers-control,
then the SG was correct that undisclosed conflicts of interest ought
also have to have been considered core offenses, but were not. 35

30. Id at 2932.
31. Id. at 2930-31.
32. Id at 2931.
33. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Brief for the United States at 42-44, nn.4-5, Skilling v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 2896 (2010).
35. Indeed, in many post-Ski/ling decisions in which courts are required to review
old convictions or test current indictments, courts have given many defendants relief
on the ground that they were not charged with bribery or self-dealing or that it is im-
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A second problem is presented by the state of the pre-McNally
caselaw and the legislative history underlying § 1346: the notion that
the Court can look to what even the majority acknowledges was a
mass of conflicting caselaw in the pre-McNally period and come up
with any credible guess regarding the congressional intent in passing §
1346 is ludicrous. 36 The legislative history of § 1346 says nothing
about which of these many intangible rights ought to be protected by
that statute. Indeed, § 1346 was attached, as one of thirty unrelated
provisions, to an omnibus drug bill that was passed on the last day of
the lOOth Congress. 37 The enacted language was "never referred to
any committee of either the House or the Senate, was never the subject of any committee report from either the House or the Senate, and

possible to tell whether the jury convicted on self-dealing or these other theories because juries were usually charged on self-dealing with bribery and kickbacks. See,
e.g., United States v. Ford, 639 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Coniglio,
417 F. App'x 146 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Jaramillo, 413 F. App'x 979 (9th Cir.
2011); Turner v. United States, 2011 WL 3859726 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (order
granting in part motion to vacate); United States v. Lynch, 2011 WL 3862842 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 31, 2011) (order granting motion for relief); United States v. Jimenez, 2011
WL 3652773 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2011) (order granting in part motion for acquittal);
United States v. Panarella, 2011 WL 3273599 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2011) (coram nobis
granted and conviction vacated); United States v. Cabrera, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1261
(M.D. Fla. 2011); United States v. Sprouse, 2011 WL 2414322 (W.D.N.C. June 10,
2011) (order granting motion for new trial); Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d
1260 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (orders granting motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence and granting motion to vacate conviction); United States v. Maricle, 2010 WL
5139420 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2010) (order granting motion for acquittal and denying
motion for new trial); Geddings v. United States, 2010 WL 2639920 (E.D.N.C. June
29, 2010) (order granting post-conviction motion to release Geddings).
36. See, e.g, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929 ("[H]onest-services decisions preceding
McNally were not models of clarity or consistency"). The Second Circuit explained
the difficulties of forging "a" meaning from the pre-McNallycaselaw:
Some circuits have implemented § 1346 by resurrecting pre-McNally law.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held that "§ 1346 has restored the mail fraud
statute to its pre-McNally scope." ... And the Fifth Circuit, after noting that
"Congress could not have intended to bless each and every pre-McNally
lower court 'honest services' opinion," observed that "Congress ... has set
us back on a course of defining 'honest services'"; and that Court has
"turn[ed] to that task." ... However, one of these approaches simply reinstates the entire, dissonant body of prior circuit precedent, while the other
invites the creation out of whole cloth of new judicial interpretations of
"honest services" -interpretations that will undoubtedly vary from circuit
to circuit. The result is "a truly extraordinary statute, in which the substantive force of the statute varie[s] in each judicial circuit."
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
37. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 739 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly, J. &
DeMoss, J., dissenting).
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was never the subject of any floor debate reported in the Congressional Record." 38 What little we can discern about Congress' intent is
found in snippets of post-enactment declarations stating only that the
legislation was designed to overturn the Court's decision in McNally.39 Therefore, all one can reasonably conclude from the record is
that Congress intended simply to reverse McNalljs ruling that mail
and wire fraud were confined to schemes targeted at property interests. Any assertion that it thereby ruled "in" or "out" any particular
theory of intangible rights is pure fiction. The Court's own analysis
demonstrates the unlikelihood that Congress intended to limit the
statute in the way the Court identified. The majority notes that bribery and kickbacks have accepted meanings, citing two federal statutes
that explicitly outlaw such conduct. 40 If Congress intended to criminalize only these two categories of cases, the Court's own cites
demonstrate that Congress knew how to do so, and it did not.
My final problem is a conceptual one that may be best illustrated
by reference to a hypothetical. Consider a statute that proscribes
"any bad act." This prohibition, like the prohibition on "honestservices" fraud, does not identify any particular conduct, mens rea, or
attendant circumstances. It may cover such varied activities as murder, improperly parking in a handicapped zone, financial fraud, or
fishing without a license. Were the Court to conclude, rightfully, that
this statute is unconstitutionally vague, could the Court- consistent
with its duty to interpret, not legislate- identify a limiting construction whereby the statute applies only to improperly parking in a
handicapped zone and fishing without a license? I assume that most
people will agree that this would be patent, and silly, "law-making."
To say that Congress "must have" intended to endorse prosecutions
of "at least" bribery and kickbacks is like saying that a prohibition on
"any bad act" can be reduced to criminalization of fishing without a
license.
But, some might argue, if the Court were to limit the "bad acts"
statute to just murder and financial fraud, that would be alright because those are also obviously wrongful acts that anyone should know
are criminal. Even leaving aside, for the moment, notice issues, I
38. Id at 742.
39. See id at 743 (stating that Congress intended to "reinstate" the pre-McNally
case law "without change" when it enacted § 1346); id at 742 (quoting 134 Cong.
Rec. H11108-01 (Oct. 21, 1988), with Rep. Conyers stating that the section
"restor[ed] the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally
decision" and that "[n]o other change in the law [was] intended").
40. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933-34.
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cannot see the sense in this argument. This vague prohibition could
also proscribe rape and robbery, which are wrongful. Why is it any
less "legislation" to pick these two out of the range of possible malum
in se choices than it is to identify fishing without a license or improperly parking in a handicapped zone as the limits of the statute? In
Skilling, for example, the Court adopted a limiting construction that
rules "in" bribery and kickbacks, but rules "out" acting on undisclosed conflicts of interest for personal gain. The latter category of
honest-services cases have been very common-indeed, many courts
have identified this type of offense, with bribery and kickbacks, as
among the "core" of honest-services prosecutions. 41
My more practical friends would argue that this is the best result
our system can yield under the circumstances. Congress has had forty
years to identify what it means by honest-services fraud with particularity, and has declined, repeatedly, to do so. In such circumstances,
the Court is justified in stepping in to remedy this congressional default and identify two areas that everyone agrees ought to be covered.
I believe, however, that this "sensible" resolution is not only patently
unconstitutional law-making on the Court's part, but it also has very
real deleterious consequences that are largely ignored.

II. "HONEST-SERVICES" FRAUD AS AN OBJECT LESSON IN WHY
CONGRESS OUGHT TO BE CHARGED WITH DEFINING THE SCOPE
OF CRIMINAL LAW
When Congress passes vague statutes such as § 1346, it is effectively delegating law-making power to the judiciary. 42 By doing so, Congress maximizes its ability to make law in spite of resource and time
constraints. 43 The constraints operating on Congress include the "difficulty of generating consensus on politically charged issues, which
can easily stifle controversial legislation. . . . One way to escape the
political heat on such questions is to enact highly general or vague
statutory language, which spares members of Congress from having to
41. See, for example, United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 2002),
where the court explained:
Honest services fraud typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery, where a
legislator was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in personal gain." United States v.
Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262, 2001 U.S.App. LEXIS 25318, at *45 (3d Cir.
2001); see also United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir.
1998).
42. See Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 11.
43. Jd at 10.
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take definitive stands that could disappoint powerful constituencies."44 Delegation also permits Congress to maximize its ability to
satisfy the demands of important constituencies for legislation; the
time and effort that otherwise would be spent consumed in the details
of criminal statutes can be directed to more politically productive ar. eas. 45
Apart from constitutional separation-of-powers, rule of law, and
notice quibbles, why might we conclude that it is not necessarily a bad
thing for the Court to attempt to arrive at "sensible" solutions to the
problem of underspecified criminal prohibitions? Professor Kahan
has argued as follows:
The cost-savings of delegated common-lawmaking stem from the
generative character of open-textured statutory norms. When treated as a delegation of lawmaking authority ... the criminal fraud
statutes, and like offenses spawn scores of distinct prohibitions. To
achieve the same result without implied delegation, Congress would
have to bear the high practical and political costs of specifying each
of these prohibitions itself. Courts can also update the criminal code
more rapidly than can Congress.46
Delegated common-lawmaking not only reduces the cost of federal
criminal law but it is also improves its quality. Congress, which necessarily makes rules in anticipation of future cases, lacks full information about how these rules will operate in the real world. Courts,
in contrast, perform their delegated lawmaking function in the
course of deciding actual cases. Consequently, they see more completely how statutes interact with real-world circumstances and with
each other and can use this information to fashion rules of law that
fully implement legislative goals and that avoid unforeseen conflicts
with other values and policies.47
Concerns about democratic legitimacy, Kahan argues, should not
trouble us when courts adopt readings of statutes that reflect a broad
societal consensus- such as one that bars trading guns for drugs. 48
The same is true of notice concerns. Kahan argues, in essence, that
where the Court extends a statute to cover otherwise "wrongful"
conduct, defendants have no equitable claim to our sympathy. Courts
only need demand greater specification from Congress when the stat-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 9-10.
at 10.
at 12.
at 12-13.
at 13.

2011]

BLIND MONKS

353

ute at issue tests "the border between socially desirable and socially
undesirable conduct."49
My own take is diametrically opposed to that staked out by Professor Kahan, especially regarding the virtues of judicial law-making in
honest-services cases. Our first, and perhaps greatest, disagreement
concerns the appropriate scope and function of federal criminal law.
As an empirical matter, no useful purpose is served by easing Congress' ability to enact yet more open-textured federal criminal laws.
"[T]he federal 'code' contains a profusion of laws so complex and
sprawling that the laws susceptible to criminal sanction cannot even
be counted" 50 A recent estimate that there are more than 4000 federal crimes does not take into account the estimated tens of thousands of federal regulations that can be criminally enforced. 51 Most
commentators
bemoan
not
only
the
accelerating52
53
"overcriminalization" phenomenon, but also the degree to which
Congress has "federalized" crimes that traditionally were left to state
law. 54 In such circumstances, the last thing we should be doing is enabling Congress' profligate tendencies by permitting it to legislate in

49. Id at 14.
50. Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648 (2006).
51. Id at 649.
52. "Whatever the exact number of crimes that comprise today's 'federal criminal
law,' it is clear that the amount of individual citizen behavior now potentially subject
to federal criminal control has increased in astonishing proportions in the last few
decades." TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW at 10 (1998),
available at http://www .americanbar.org/content/darn/aba/publications/criminalj ustice
/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf.
The ABA Task Force's research revealed that "[m]ore than 40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970. Id at 7.
This "explosive" growth has "continued unabated." JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FEDERALIST Soc'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE
GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 8 (2004), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/measuring-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crimelegislation. Indeed, the number of statutory provisions susceptible to criminal enforcement has increased by one-third since 1980. Id
53. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: the Politics of Crime, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 541 (2005). Professor Erik Luna has pointed out that this one phenomenon actually comprises a number of problems: "(1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or
pretextual enforcement of petty violations." Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005).
54. See Luna, supra note 53, at 708.
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general terms, confident that courts will pick up the constitutional
slack.
Allowing Congress to avoid the costs- in time and political capital-of appropriate specificity, moreover, is also not a societal good.
Certainly our constitutional structure and procedural safeguards evidence a choice: that it should be difficult to enact criminal legislation
and it should be difficult to subject individuals to criminal sanction.
Where a sufficiently strong consensus does not exist to move Congress and the President to agree to criminalize identified conduct, it
ought not be criminalized.
Political actors should be required to make political choices before
exposing individuals to jail time or worse. Judges not only lack the
democratic legitimacy to do so, but they also may lack any awareness
that the issue they are addressing actually contains policy trade-offs.
For example, Kahan notes that efforts "to specify what or who constituted 'organized crime' in RICO ... provoked strong opposition by
organized labor, civil libertarians, and other interest groups." 55 In all
the time I have written about and taught RICO, the threat this contested legal definition might pose to labor never crossed my radar
screen. I assume that judges are similarly unaware of the political and
policy trade-offs inherent in the statutory questions presented to
them. They are trained to believe that such trade-offs should generally be irrelevant to their jobs.
My second principal disagreement with the above analysis concerns
the assessment that judges will produce better, more up-to-date criminal statutes if they accept congressional invitations to flesh out the
specifics of vague prohibitions. Quite simply, the common law method of adjudication does not lend itself to effective legislation.
Judges hear principally from two stakeholders: the defense and the
prosecution. In a perfect world, defense counsel will try to move
judges to adopt a more defense-favorable (i.e., limited) construction
of applicable statutory prohibitions. But defense counsel have an ethical obligation to do their best for one client at a time, in one case at a
time. Their focus is necessarily narrow and exclusive. Unless the
views of others will serve the interests of their clients, counsel are unlikely to solicit or share with the court the perspectives of those who
may be affected by the legislation. For example, defense counsel
would generally have no time or incentive to solicit labor or civil libertarians to weigh in on the proper construction of the term "orga-

55. Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 9-10.
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nized crime," even if the court were willing to entertain the views of
such amici.
Federal prosecutors, who share an obligation to "do justice" as well
as to represent zealously the government in each particular case, can
take a longer view, litigating over time to achieve pre-determined policy goals. But again, the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) perspective
is narrow and partial. It, too, is unlikely to be concerned about bringing to the court's attention the varied interests of those who may have
a stake in the outcome. Congress, then, is likely- if it actually considers the legislation on the merits before passage- to have a better
sense of the "right" policy choice given all the competing interests
implicated or at least will be able to claim democratic legitimacy in
reconciling competing political druthers.
Some argue that courts have the benefit of seeing the statute applied in the "real world," so that judges' decisions about the scope of
a statute are likely to be based on actual experience, not projections.
This, too, is questionable. Judges only see what prosecutors charge; it
is the DOJ, not judges, who will determine if, when, and how issues
will be presented to courts for determination. Strategic choices may
be made, for example, to bring the more palatable but legally questionable cases for initial determination and, once judges have signed
on, then to proceed with cases that are factually less sympathetic.
Further, many cases come before the Court simply as guilty pleasindeed upwards of 95% of federal criminal cases are concluded by
plea. 56 And these cases of course receive the most minimal judicial
scrutiny other than a quick allocution under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11. In the overwhelming majority of cases, then, the defendant has concluded for whatever reason to take the plea, and the
Court is never asked to rule on the legitimacy of the prosecution's
theory of fraud.57

56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS FIGURE C (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_sourcebooks/2010/SBTOClO.htm. Plea rates in federal courts have
remained in the 95%-97% range for a decade or more. See, e.g., id (96.8% guilty
pleas in 2010, 96.3% in 2009, and 95.7% in 2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2003/ch5-2003.PDF (95.7% guilty pleas in 2003).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 2011 WL 3862842, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31,
2011) (citing two cases in which defendants took guilty pleas under theories that were
subsequently invalidated in Skilling.) The court concluded that "both defendants
were convicted of conduct that is no longer a crime and that, as a result, they are entitled to collateral relief." /d. at *8.
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Judges are like the proverbial blind monks examining the elephant- they each see only a fragment of the picture because what
comes before them is necessarily random and happenstantial. Trial
judges only have this immediate connection with cases in their courtrooms. And on appeal, where much of the definitive assessment is
made of the reach of the statute, the government has a huge advantage. On appeal of a conviction, the appeals court must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and must
affirm unless no reasonable jury could have concluded on the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
although I cannot prove it, I believe based on my anecdotal experience that appellate judges are extremely reluctant to overturn jury
verdicts on the facts or the law- and will go to great lengths, even
when dealing with legal issues, to resolve them in favor of retaining
the jury's guilty verdict.
If efficiency is what is prized, then common law adjudication is a
terrible way of proceeding. Take the honest-services doctrine. The
original mail fraud provision, enacted in 1872, was amended in 1909
to create a disjunctive prohibition- that is, using the mails to perpetrate "any scheme or artifice to defraud" or "for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises." 58 The government started bringing "intangible" rights
prosecutions, arguing that given the statutory disjunction between the
"schemes to defraud" and "money or property" clauses, the former
must have been intended to vindicate non-property rights. 59 Starting
in 1941, the "Courts of Appeals, one after the other, agreed, interpreting the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' to include deprivations not only of money or property, but also of intangible rights." 60
The problem was that the decisions of the Courts of Appeals were,
to put it mildly, "not models of clarity or consistency." 61 The Supreme Court ignored the "considerable disarray" 62 below until its decision in McNally v. United States in 1987- that is, for forty-six
years.63 In McNally, the Court held that despite forty-six years of unbroken Courts of Appeals opinions upholding various versions of
honest-services fraud, it was not in fact a crime because mail and wire

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010).
Id at 2926.
Id
Id at 2929.
Id
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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fraud were confined to schemes to defraud victims of money, not intangible non-property rights. 64
Congress responded by enacting, the following year, a statute (§
1346) that defined the term "scheme or artifice to defraud" for purposes of mail and wire (and other) frauds to include a scheme to "deprive another of the intangible right of honest-services. "65 The Courts
of Appeals, faced with this un-illuminating prohibition, spent decades
trying to ascertain the meaning of § 1346, with widely divergent results.66 The circuits split on the mens rea, actus reus, and attendant
circumstances necessary to prove this crime. It was only after twentytwo years of conflicting decisions in all the Courts of Appeals that the
Supreme Court decided Skilling. 67 And in that case, the Court did not
address the three circuit splits that apparently warranted its intervention, coming up with a novel theory of its own for defining the scope
of the statute. 68 Not unexpectedly, this has generated yet more litigation below as lower courts attempt to apply the Court's holding.
The Court's evident decision to let circuit splits again "percolate,"
this time for twenty-plus years, indicates a truly shocking lack of
awareness that these are splits about the meaning of criminal statutes
that are supposedly only legitimate if reasonably facially clear. To
countenance splits on their fundamental elements for decades is to
accept that our supposed commitment to fair notice and nonretroactive definitions of criminal sanctions is a patently empty one.
Perhaps equally discouraging is the institutional arrogance- and
waste- inherent in the Court's willingness to ignore the distilled wisdom of years of lower court efforts. The Court was apparently taken
with amicus briefs that proposed a novel rule stating that § 1346
should be defined as confined to bribery and kickbacks and, without
more, decided to adopt that rule. 69 The problem, of course, is painfully evident in the Court's own cites to code sections in which Congress
defined "bribery" and "kickbacks." Congress clearly knew how to
outlaw such behavior and did not do so in § 1346.
What is truly infuriating about all this are the practical costs that
are so comprehensively ignored. Yes, if the law is in a real sense inaccessible, people cannot make the rational calculation necessary for
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Jd at 360.
18 u.s.c. § 1346 (2011).
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927.
Jd
Jd at 2933.
Jd at 2907.
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effective deterrence. Yes, a code that does not give fair notice will
undermine faith in the criminal justice system as a whole, and undercut the moral stigma upon which the credibility of the system must
rest. These abstractions ought to carry great weight. But the ultimate
value protected by the legality principle and attendant interpretive
doctrines is nothing short of the value of individual freedom.
No one can put a price on that, and it may seem simply an ideal to
some. But surely everyone should understand and appreciate the
cumulative misery visited upon suspects and defendants over the last
sixty-eight years as courts have attempted to figure out what honestservices fraud does and does not cover. Hundreds if not thousands of
individuals have been subjected to investigations and prosecutions
and jail time for conduct that we know, only after the Court belatedly
ruled in McNally and now Skilling, was not in fact criminal.
These investigations and trials are humiliating and often financially
disastrous: homes lost and savings ravaged. Such prosecutions are inevitably highly stressful: they can tear apart families and traumatize
the defendant's children. The defendants usually lose their jobs and,
not infrequently, their livelihood by virtue of the stigma and collateral
consequences of a conviction. The defendant can, under the federal
sentencing guidelines, be subjected to long prison terms.7° Given the
length of these terms, many of them will not qualify for the so-called
"Club Feds," but rather will serve their time in "real" prisons often
located far from family and friends. It is cold comfort to these defendants- and should be a real scandal- that the Supreme Court,
years after their convictions, can say that we were all wrong in believing that the statute covered such conduct. As Professor Andrew
Leipold explains:
[A] factually innocent defendant confronts the problem of being
publicly accused by the government of criminal behavior with no real prospect of ever being officially vindicated [as "innocent" rather
than simply "not guilty"]. An innocent suspect may have the charges
dismissed or may be acquitted, but the sequella of an indictment
may leave the defendant's reputation, personal relationships, and
ability to earn a living so badly damaged that he may never be able
to return to the life he knew before being accused. More subtly, a
person who was once charged with a crime is put on a different (and
far less desirable) track in the legal system than someone who has

70. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 5, Pt. A (2011), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/20ll_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_5.pdf.
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never been arrested. A later acquittal or dismissal does surprisingly
little to relieve an innocent defendant of the resulting burdens. 71

"Oops, sorry," or "better late than never" obviously does not cut it.
"This is the way the system works, imperfect as it is" should not do either because this is not the way the system should or has to be. First,
the Court should not have allowed sixty-eight years to elapse during
which the scope of the doctrine was uncertain. Second, the Court
should have thrown this obviously vague statute right back into Congress' lap. Perhaps if the Court did so more often, instead of trying to
"fix" deficient statutes, Congress would get the message that it must
define criminal conduct at least to let citizens know what conduct, attended by what mens rea and attendant circumstances, can subject
them to criminal prosecution and stigma. And it apparently is possible to draft a decent statute, including one that defines intangible
rights. 72
Some might argue that what many of the defendants in these cases
did was "wrong" even if not expressly proscribed by criminal law.
Thus, they would point to those who manipulated an undisclosed conflict of interest for personal gain- that is, those whose conduct the
Skilling Court decreed does not fall within the honest-services prohibition. These were cases in which the prosecutor, jury, and judges all
agreed that what the defendant did was criminally reprehensible.
Apparently the view would be that these folks should have known
that what they did was "wrong." I have heard this argument, implicitly or explicitly, from many folks. In such circumstances, we need lose
little sleep over the improper prosecutions of people who were morally, if not legally, guilty.
71. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2000); see also United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817
(3d Cir. 1979) ("[W]hile in theory a trial provides a defendant with a full opportunity
to contest and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later
dismissal or acquittal can never undo."); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458-59 (2d Cir.
1947) ("[A] wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable injury to the person indicted. The stigma cannot be easily erased. In the
public mind, the blot on a man's escutcheon, resulting from such a public accusation
of wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently, the public remembers the accusation, and still suspects guilt, even after an
acquittal.").
72. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a
provision of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was not
void for vagueness where it stated that labor organization officials occupy positions
of trust within such organizations and are trusted by their members as a group, and
specified the duties the officials owed to the union and members they serve.).

360

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

The problems with this argument are many. First, it rests on the
unsustainable assumption that we can agree on who has acted "immorally"- by no means a given in our diverse society- and the naive
assumption that the government will apply a usefully vague statute
only to pursue such "immoral" people. Neither assumption is, in my
view, provable. Second, from an institutional point of view, this contention is contrary to the foundations of our system of constitutional
criminal justice. Our system of government makes it difficult for the
executive to deprive any citizen of his or her liberty. I hardly need to
recite the complete litany: the defendant is presumed innocent; the
government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
and the defendant is entitled to due process in a fair and impartial
public trial with the assistance of counsel and the benefit of a right
against compelled self-incrimination. All of this is designed to allow
the average citizen to operate securely in the knowledge that he is
free to act as he wishes unless he steps over a clearly defined legal,
not moral, line. There are many other social means by which those
who cross moral lines can be held to account. Prosecutions are, and
should be, reserved for those who cause criminal harm.
To contend that that line ought to depend, instead, on prosecutors'
views of the "morality" of a defendant's actions is a repudiation of the
framers' wisdom. And it is downright scary to those of us who do not
believe men are angels, and who recognize our own fallibility.

